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I. INTRODUCTION
 A patient has an indisputable right under federal and state laws to set forth her 
wishes for end-of-life medical care in an advance directive or other legal document, or 
by way of a health care proxy.1 Such directives are legally binding in that they can be 
used to enjoin a medical provider from administering life-sustaining care against the 
patient’s wishes.2 However, if a medical provider wrongfully provides treatment in 
contravention of the patient’s directive, the force of this directive essentially vanishes. 
For the past few decades, patients in such situations have been unable to recover in 
tort for the injury of suffering unwanted life-sustaining treatment, commonly referred 
to as the tort of “wrongful living” or “wrongful prolongation of life.”3
 For years, the right to set limits on the care one receives at the end of life has 
been described as an “illusory protection,”4 a “false promise,”5 and a “right without a 
remedy.”6 Countless scholars have written critically about the failure of tort law to 
accommodate claims of wrongful living,7 described as recently as 2011 as a cause of 
action that “has not gained traction.”8 Judging by the most recent legal scholarship, 
1. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation (Patient Self-Determination) Act of 1990 § 4206, 42 U.S.C. § 
1395cc(f) (2012); Barry Furrow et al., Health Law 840–49 (2d ed. 2000).
2. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 220–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (finding, after 
patient’s death, that trial court erred in denying an injunction ordering withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment for patient who had executed a living will); Delio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 516 
N.Y.S.2d 677, 679–81 (2d Dep’t 1987) (authorizing discontinuance of treatment based on evidence of 
patient’s clearly expressed wishes while competent); Blackman v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 660 
N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 671 N.Y.S.2d 339 (2d Dep’t 
1998) (directing hospital to withhold medical treatment in light of evidence of patient’s clearly expressed 
wishes while competent).
3. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of 
Action, 75 Geo. L.J. 625 (1986) (defining “wrongful living”). Note, however, that the tort of wrongful 
living is not an independent cause of action: the term is used to describe a tort claim of battery or 
negligence when the resulting injury is the unwanted extension of life. See Holly Fernandez Lynch, 
Michele Mathes & Nadia N. Sawicki, Compliance with Advance Directives: Wrongful Living and Tort 
Law Incentives, 29 J. Legal Med. 133, 141–42 (2008). As the Ohio Supreme Court explained in one of 
the most frequently cited wrongful living cases, “a claim of wrongful living is a damages concept, just as 
a claim for ‘wrongful whiplash’ or ‘wrongful broken arm,’ and must necessarily involve an underlying 
claim of negligence or battery.” Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 
(Ohio 1996).
4. Marni J. Lerner, State Natural Death Acts: Illusory Protection of Individuals’ Life-Sustaining Treatment 
Decisions, 29 Harv. J. on Legis. 175 (1992).
5. Henry S. Perkins, Controlling Death: The False Promise of Advance Directives, 147 Annals Internal 
Med. 51 (2007).
6. Mark Strasser, A Jurisprudence in Disarray: On Battery, Wrongful Living, and the Right to Bodily Integrity, 
36 San Diego L. Rev. 997, 1040 (1999); see also Maggie J. Randall Robb, Living Wills: The Right to 
Refuse Life Sustaining Medical Treatment—A Right Without a Remedy?, 23 U. Dayton L. Rev. 169 
(1997); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Where There Is a Right, There Ought 
to Be a Remedy, 25 N. Ky. L. Rev. 649 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Lynch et al., supra note 3; Perkins, supra note 5; Strasser, supra note 6.
8. Nicole Marie Saitta & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Wrongful Prolongation of Life—A Cause of Action That Has 
Not Gained Traction Even Though a Physician Has Disregarded a “Do Not Resuscitate” Order, 30 Temp. J. 
281
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
patients seeking ex post enforcement of their wishes to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment essentially have no legal recourse.
 This article is one of the first to offer an ultimately optimistic perspective about 
the viability of tort claims for wrongful prolongation of life.9 A variety of recent 
developments—including favorable jury verdicts, legal settlements, supportive 
judicial commentary, and proposed legislation—suggests that plaintiffs seeking 
recovery for a wrong that has traditionally been considered non-compensable may 
have greater success in the future.
 Part II of this article explains the basis of patients’ rights to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment and prepare legal directives to preserve the right to refuse when they lack 
competence. Part III traces the history of tort claims for medical providers’ refusal to 
comply with patients’ wishes to limit care at the end of life and explains the reasons 
why courts have been unwilling to recognize such claims. Part IV outlines a series of 
promising legislative, administrative, and judicial developments suggesting that there 
may yet be a life for the wrongful living cause of action. Finally, Part V provides 
concrete recommendations for patients who want to ensure that their end-of-life 
preferences will be respected and for advocates tasked with seeking recovery on 
behalf of patients who have not been so fortunate.
II. SOURCES OF PATIENTS’ RIGHTS
 The patient’s right to refuse unwanted medical care has long been recognized as 
a fundamental principle of health law.10 It took decades, however, for legal consensus 
to form about whether this right extends to the refusal of life-sustaining treatment, 
such as mechanical ventilation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and artificial 
nutrition and hydration. These treatments are unique as compared to traditional 
medical care because they are absolutely necessary for the sustenance of life. If a 
patient chooses not to take an antibiotic that has been prescribed for her, for example, 
she may not recover from her illness as quickly, but it is unlikely that she will die. In 
contrast, a patient whose heart stops beating but who has signed a do-not-resuscitate 
order will necessarily die, as will the patient who is unable to take food or water by 
mouth and refuses artificial nutrition and hydration, or the patient who is unable to 
breathe on her own and refuses mechanical ventilation.
Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 221, 221, 238 (2011) (concluding that “[t]he only viable remedy” for ensuring 
compliance with end-of-life wishes is by way of an injunction, and that recovery of damages is “not a 
realistic option at the present time.”).
9. Authors of law review articles frequently claim, perhaps with an excess of confidence, that they are 
among the first to make an important point or address an undiscovered topic. In this instance, the claim 
is actually true. Of the forty-three law review articles published since 2000 that include the terms 
“wrongful living” or “wrongful prolongation of life,” only one other article, authored by Thaddeus 
Mason Pope of Hamline University School of Law and published in 2013, has likewise offered a 
generally optimistic perspective on the viability of such claims. See infra note 29.
10. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129–30 (1914) (“Every human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon 
who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in 
damages.”).
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 Following the patients’ rights movements of the 1960s,11 state courts took the 
lead in clarifying that patients can legitimately rely on theories of tort law to protect 
themselves from unwanted medical care, even if the consequence of their refusal is 
death. In Bouvia v. Superior Court, for example, a California appellate court held that 
that the penumbral constitutional privacy right identified by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Griswold v. Connecticut extends to a competent, non-terminal patient’s right to 
refuse life-sustaining nasogastric feeding.12
 Judicial decisions like that of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan also 
led the way in establishing that a patient’s right to refuse life-saving treatment may 
be exercised by a surrogate or legally appointed guardian on the patient’s behalf.13 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in 1990 in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health, a case challenging Missouri’s requirement that proof of an 
incompetent patient’s wishes to refuse treatment be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.14 The Court’s decision was somewhat unusual in that it did not 
definitively establish a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining care—rather, the 
Court merely “assume[d]” for the purposes of the case at hand “that the United 
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected 
right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition.”15 The decision in Cruzan capped 
off a long scholarly and legislative push towards increasing patients’ use of advance 
directives to document their end-of-life wishes.16
 Cruzan was decided in June 1990. In November 1990, Congress passed the 
Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA), a seminal piece of legislation that made 
patients’ rights at the end of life even more concrete.17 The PSDA requires that all 
health care facilities receiving Medicare and Medicaid funding provide admitted 
patients with written information about their legal rights to refuse medical treatment 
and to execute advance directives, as well as about the facility’s policies and procedures 
11. See Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical Consumerism and 
the Patients’ Rights, Women’s Health and Disability Rights Movements, 20 Am. J.L. & Med. 147, 150–53 
(1994) (describing the patients’ rights movement). These developments were perhaps most clearly visible 
in the realm of mental health treatment. See generally Paul Appelbaum, Almost a Revolution: 
Mental Health Law and the Limits of Change 10–11 (1994).
12. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301–05 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
13. See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (holding that the father of a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state may be appointed as her guardian to authorize termination of mechanical ventilation).
14. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
15. Id. at 279.
16. The first scholarly proposal of living wills appears to be a 1969 article by Louis Kutner in the Indiana 
Law Journal. See generally Louis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 Ind. 
L.J. 539 (1969). The first state-law living will act, the California Natural Death Act, was adopted in 
1977. Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance 
Care Document, 10 Est. & Tr. J. 134, 135 (1990). By 1991, more than forty states had living will statutes. 
George J. Annas, The Health Care Proxy and the Living Will, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1210 (1991).
17. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation (Patient Self-Determination) Act of 1990 § 4206, 42 U.S.C. § 
1395cc(f) (2012).
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for complying with advance directives.18 The facilities are required to have policies in 
place for documenting advance directives, complying with state law regarding 
advance directives, and educating community and staff about issues relating to 
advance directives.19 Indeed, state legislation continues to play an important role in 
establishing patients’ rights to refuse life-saving care. Today, every state has a law 
relating to advance directives, and most states have laws providing for a combination 
of living wills and durable powers of attorney or health care proxies—the essential 
legal tools that allow patients to exercise their end-of-life choices even after they lose 
competence.20
III. THE WRONGFUL LIVING CAUSE OF ACTION: WHY IT HAS MET WITH RESISTANCE
 Despite the well-established right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, and 
the legal authority for executing an advance directive to govern care when the patient is 
incompetent or otherwise unable to express her own wishes, some medical providers 
are nevertheless reluctant to withdraw life-saving care. Evidence of this can be found 
in a host of cases in which physicians, nurses, or emergency medical technicians have, 
against a patient’s wishes, initiated or continued unwanted CPR,21 blood transfusion,22 
open-heart surgery,23 life support,24 or artificial nutrition and hydration.25 Further 
evidence is found in academic research about the disconnect between patients’ end-of-
life wishes and providers’ understanding of those wishes.26
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34:2 Hastings Ctr. 
Rep. 30, 31 (2004). Some of these laws are based on the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, approved 
by the Uniform Law Commissioners in 1993. See generally Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act, 9 pt. 
IB U.L.A. 88 (1993).
21. See, e.g., Self v. Milyard, No. 11-CV-00813-RBJ-CBS, 2012 WL 3704958 (D. Colo. July 31, 2012); 
Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1986); Anderson v. St. 
Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
22. See, e.g., Werth v. Taylor, 475 N.W.2d 426 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
23. See, e.g., Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
24. See, e.g., Duarte v. Chino Cmty. Hosp., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521 (Ct. App. 1999); Allore v. Flower Hosp., 
699 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1984). See also Tamar Lewin, Ignoring “Right to Die” Directives, Medical Community Is Being Sued, N.Y. 
Times, June 2, 1996, at A1 (discussing the case of Brenda Young).
25. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987).
26. See, for example, the nationwide Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and 
Risks of Treatment (SUPPORT) undertaken in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The SUPPORT study 
found that even after intensive interventions designed to improve the exchange of information about 
end-of-life wishes between patients and physicians, few physicians accurately understood their patients’ 
preferences. A Controlled Trial to Improve Outcomes for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to 
Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment, 274 JAMA 1591 (1995); Ellen 
H. Moskowitz & James Lindemann Nelson, The Best Laid Plans, 25:6 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 3,3 (1995).
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 Medical professionals are trained in improving health and preserving life,27 and 
their dedication towards achieving these goals is to be commended. However, an 
equally unshakeable principle of medical practice is that treatments should not be 
administered against a patient’s wishes.28 Why, then, are there so many cases of 
physician noncompliance with advance directives? One of the most likely reasons is 
the fear, however unwarranted, of liability for prematurely ending a patient’s life.29 
The medical community operates under a shadow of potential liability for 
malpractice—this explains the prevalence of the practice of “defensive medicine,” 
whereby providers administer tests or render treatments that are not beneficial, but 
that could be cited in a lawsuit as evidence of thoroughness and due care.30
 Physicians are all too aware of the threat of wrongful death litigation if a patient 
dies on their watch. In contrast, the likelihood (both perceived and actual) of a 
successful legal challenge for continuing a patient’s life is limited.31 In the words of 
one hospital administrator, her institution would “rather have a wrongful liv[ing] 
claim than a wrongful death claim.”32 This imbalance in the threat of tort liability 
leads medical providers and administrators to quite reasonably conclude that the legal 
risks associated with terminating treatment are greater than the risks of continuing 
treatment.33
 These skewed tort law incentives arise because courts have traditionally been 
extremely reluctant to award damages when patients or their families bring suit for 
wrongful continuation of life.34 When patients whose physicians are reluctant to 
withdraw unwanted treatment seek ex ante relief in the form of an injunction or 
declaratory judgment, courts have typically expressed willingness to enforce the 
patients’ wishes, particularly if they are documented in an advance directive.35 But 
27. See Walter Glannon, Biomedical Ethics 1–2 (2005) (citing developments in medical ethics from 
the Hippocratic Oath onward).
28. See Tom Beauchamp & James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 117–21 (6th ed. 2009) 
(discussing the ethical grounding of the informed consent doctrine).
29. See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Clinicians May Not Administer Life-Sustaining Treatment Without 
Consent: Civil, Criminal, and Disciplinary Sanctions, 9 J. Health & Biomed. L. 213, 238–39 (2013). 
There are, however, many other reasons why physicians may decline to comply with patients’ end-of-life 
wishes, including lack of awareness of a patient’s advance directive, lack of communication, and 
conscientious objection. See Saitta & Hodge, supra note 8, at 229–32 (discussing why medical providers 
may ignore advance directives requesting withdrawal of treatment).
30. See generally Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q.J. Econ. 
353 (1996).
31. See Lynch et al., supra note 3, at 148–49.
32. Judy Greenwald, Medical Ethics and Risk Management: Liability at Life’s End; Providers Risk Suits by 
Reviving Patients, Bus. Ins., May 20, 1996.
33. See generally Lynch et al., supra note 3; Pope, supra note 29.
34. See generally Lynch et al., supra note 3.
35. See Saitta & Hodge, supra note 8, at 238 (describing injunctive relief as “the only viable remedy” at this 
time). See also Rosebush v. Oakland Cnty. Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); In re 
Fiori, 652 A.2d 1350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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patients who seek ex post recovery once a rights violation has already occurred are 
often left with no legal remedy. There are three main reasons why patients who are 
provided with life-sustaining treatment against their will typically face an uphill 
battle when seeking damages for the injury to their right of self-determination: (A) 
statutory immunity for medical providers; (B) statutory and contextual limitations on 
the applicability of advance directives; and (C) the common law doctrine that life 
does not constitute an injury. Each is discussed in turn below.
 A. Statutory Immunity for Medical Providers
 Some state laws relating to advance directives and end-of-life care explicitly 
provide legal immunity for medical providers who are not willing to comply with a 
patient’s advance directive. 36 State legislatures that have granted statutory immunity 
in these situations have weighed the interests at stake and concluded that patients 
should not be able to seek legal recovery if their end-of-life wishes are disregarded.37 
Notably, many such statutes do not distinguish between situations in which the 
patient has requested ongoing life support and those in which the patient has 
expressed a wish to stop treatment.38
 Typically, these statutes are drafted in a way that protects a physician from liability, 
provided she has used her best medical judgment.39 Oklahoma’s advance directive 
statute, for example, states that a health care provider “whose actions under the 
Oklahoma Advance Directive Act are in accord with reasonable medical standards” 
will not be subject to criminal liability, civil liability, or professional discipline with 
respect to those actions.40 Nevada law provides that the physician “must give weight” 
to a patient’s declaration of wishes, but “may also consider other factors in determining 
36. See Saitta & Hodge, supra note 8, at 226–27 (discussing statutory immunity); Gregory Gelfand, Living 
Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 737, 768–78 (1987) (noting that many immunity 
statutes treat advance directives as merely advisory or permissive).
37. The existence of immunity statutes such as these is somewhat odd in light of the fact that courts have 
typically been unwilling to recognize a common law cause of action for wrongful living. Presumably, a 
statutory grant of immunity would be necessary only if there were a possibility of civil or criminal 
liability in the absence of such a statute.
38. See infra text citing statutes at notes 40–42. But cf. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19a-571 (2013) (providing 
immunity when a physician “withholds, removes or causes the removal of a life support system of an 
incapacitated patient,” provided he has first “considered the patient’s wishes”). There also exist “treat-
til-transfer” requirements, which, as a practical matter, apply only when a patient requests ongoing 
treatment but the medical provider is unwilling to provide it. See Robert Powell Ctr. for Med. 
Ethics, Will Your Advance Directive Be Followed? (rev. ed. Dec. 2012), available at http://
www.nrlc.org/euthanasia/AdvancedDirectives/WillYourAdvanceDirectiveBeFollowed.pdf.
39. Saitta & Hodge, supra note 8, at 227.
40. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 3101.10(B) (2013). See also Cal. Prob. Code § 4740 (West 2013) (providing civil 
and criminal immunity for providers and institutions “acting in good faith and in accordance with 
generally accepted health care standards . . . for any actions in compliance with [the Uniform Health 
care Decisions Act] . . . .”); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-10(a)(3) (2013) (providing that failure to comply 
with “any direction or decision by the health care agent” will not be subject to liability provided that the 
decision is “substantially in accord with reasonable medical standards” and the provider cooperates in 
the transfer of the patient).
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whether the circumstances warrant following the directions” and will not be liable if 
she chooses not to follow the patient’s directive.41 Minnesota law expressly provides 
that a health care provider who administers life-sustaining treatment against the 
wishes of a patient or her agent will not be subject to criminal, civil, or administrative 
liability, provided that the decision is made known and is documented, and the patient 
has an opportunity to transfer.42
 Ostensibly, exemptions based on best medical judgment are often included in 
these immunity statutes because of how the medical standard of care is defined as a 
matter of common law. Under state common law, a physician will be liable for 
malpractice only if her actions deviate from what her peers (either a majority of peers 
or a respectable minority) would normally do.43 In other words, as long as a medical 
provider can demonstrate that her best exercise of medical judgment conforms to 
that of her peers, she would be free from liability for common law malpractice, just as 
she would be free from liability under the immunity statutes.
 Some courts, however, have interpreted even narrowly tailored immunity statutes 
as completely foreclosing the possibility of liability when a physician administers or 
continues life-sustaining treatment against a patient’s wishes. In Stolle v. Baylor 
College of Medicine, for example, a Texas appellate court considered the claims of 
parents against pediatricians who used “heroic efforts” to save their brain-damaged 
child in contravention of a medical directive.44 The Texas Natural Death Act 
explicitly provided that medical professionals would not be held “civilly or criminally 
liable for failing to effectuate a qualified patient’s directive.”45 The court denied the 
parents’ claims, holding that the statutory immunity provided by the Natural Death 
Act precluded the possibility of tort liability under common law.46 In a similar case, 
a California appellate court rejected a wrongful living claim on the ground that state 
law immunized providers from liability for failing to comply with a request to 
discontinue life-sustaining treatment by a patient’s attorney-in-fact or surrogate.47
 State laws that provide statutory immunity for medical providers who fail (under 
some circumstances, at least) to comply with patients’ advance directives make it far 
more difficult for such patients to recover damages when their wishes are disregarded. 
Accordingly, patients and their advocates must be aware of state law limitations on 
provider liability when considering whether litigation is even feasible in the event 
that a patient’s life is prolonged against her will.
41. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 449.640 (2013).
42. See Minn. Stat. § 145C.11(c) (2012).
43. See generally Furrow et al., supra note 1, at 264–66 (discussing the standard of care).
44. 981 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Tex. App. 1998).
45. Id. at 712 (quoting Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 672.016(b) (West 2013)).
46. Id. at 714.
47. See Duarte v. Chino Cmty. Hosp., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521, 523–24 (Ct. App. 1999).
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 B. Statutory and Contextual Limitations
 Many patients are surprised to learn that their advance directives will not 
automatically go into effect when they lose competence to make medical judgments. 
State laws impose a variety of conditions that must be satisfied before a medical 
directive takes effect. The most significant of these is the requirement, codified in 
about half of all states, that a patient be “terminally ill” or satisfy some other physical 
condition—be in a permanent vegetative state, for example—before an advance 
directive can be used to direct her treatment.48 Many states require that this diagnosis 
be confirmed by two physicians;49 some also require a formal medical determination 
of lack of capacity.50
 A number of suits brought by patients to recover for unwanted continuation of 
life-sustaining treatment have failed when courts have determined that the conditions 
set forth by the state’s living will act, or by the advance directive itself, were not 
satisfied.51 In Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Systems, for example, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals, that state’s highest court, noted that the state’s law provided that 
an advance directive becomes effective under the conditions specified by the declarant 
or, if no such conditions are specified, when two physicians certify in writing that 
the patient is not competent to make medical decisions.52 According to the Court of 
Appeals, the living will of the declarant in that case never became operative because 
“there [was] no evidence that any physicians certified that [he] was in a terminal 
condition and that his death was imminent,” as was required by the terms of his 
living will.53
 Wrongful living suits may also fail when state law narrowly defines the types of 
life-sustaining treatments that can be rejected or withdrawn. In Ross v. Hilltop 
Rehabilitation Hospital, for example, a Colorado district court rejected the plaintiff ’s 
wrongful living claim because the Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act 
specifically excluded artificial nutrition and hydration from its definition of “life-
48. See Lerner, supra note 4, at 188–97; Gelfand, supra note 36, at 740–47. 
49. See Gelfand, supra note 36, at 763–66. See also Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 728 A.2d 
166, 170 (Md. 1999), superseded by statute, Health Care Decisions Act, 2000 Md. Laws 152, Md. Code 
Ann., Health-Gen. § 5-608 (LexisNexis 2013), as recognized in Plein v. Dep’t of Labor, 800 A.2d 757, 
765 n.5 (Md. 2002).
50. See, e.g., Ficke v. Evangelical Health Sys., 674 N.E.2d 888, 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (citing Illinois 
statute regarding physician determination of lack of capacity). Additional requirements may apply in 
some states—for example, some statutes provide that an advance directive will not be deemed effective 
if the patient is pregnant. See generally Timothy J. Burch, Incubator or Individual? The Legal and Policy 
Deficiencies of Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health Directive Statutes, 54 Md. L. Rev. 528 
(1995).
51. See, e.g., Stolle, 981 S.W.2d at 713 (stressing that none of the treating physicians had categorized the 
patient’s condition as terminal); Ficke, 674 N.E.2d at 892 (finding that no physician had made a formal 
determination of lack of patient capacity).
52. 728 A.2d at 169–70.
53. Id. at 175.
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sustaining procedures.”54 Because the plaintiff ’s claim was based on the unwanted 
administration of nutrition and hydration, it was unsuccessful.55
 Finally, the context in which the plaintiff ’s claim is made may reduce her likelihood 
of success. Specifically, some courts have rejected claims that medical providers 
wrongfully disregarded advance directives in cases in which the patient’s directive was 
considered to be not contemporaneous enough with the condition that triggered a 
medical decision. In Werth v. Taylor, in which a Michigan appellate court engaged in a 
particularly extreme form of this kind of reasoning, the patient was a Jehovah’s Witness 
who believed that receiving blood transfusions was a sin.56 When she became pregnant, 
she filed a written confirmation of her desire to refuse blood products at the hospital 
where she planned to deliver; when she was admitted for delivery, her husband signed 
another refusal form on her behalf.57 However, when she experienced life-threatening 
uterine bleeding during delivery, her physicians provided a blood transfusion.58 The 
court found that the patient’s clearly stated refusals of blood products were not 
applicable in a life-or-death context because they were made while she was 
contemplating a routine delivery, and not when “it appeared death might be a possibility 
if a transfusion were not given.”59 Such reasoning strains credulity, as it would support 
a physician’s decision to let a patient’s condition deteriorate before providing unwanted 
treatment, and then to claim that the patient’s directive was inoperative because it did 
not contemplate a deteriorated condition.60
 Just as with the statutory immunity provisions described above, state law limitations 
on the contexts in which advance directives are considered valid can limit patients’ 
ability to recover when treatment is provided against their wishes. A patient who is not 
competent to express her wishes regarding life-sustaining care at the time it is needed 
may reasonably expect her previously stated wishes to be respected. But if, for example, 
state law dictates that advance directives are only effective when a patient is in a 
terminal condition, and the patient in question has more than six months to live, her 
physician may be legally justified in disregarding her earlier written directive.
 C. Common Law Doctrine: Life Is Not an Injury
 The final, and most important, reason why courts traditionally have rejected 
recovery for wrongful living is that most consider such recovery incompatible with 
54. 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1534 (D. Colo. 1987) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-18-103(7) (2012)).
55. Id.
56. See Werth v. Taylor, 475 N.W.2d 426, 427–30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 430.
60. See Lynch et al., supra note 3, at 163–64; Strasser, supra note 6, at 1009–10. See also Estate of Leach v. 
Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that consent to a particular treatment 
cannot be implied in emergency situations if the patient has clearly withheld consent to that treatment 
on previous occasions).
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traditional principles of tort law. A tort law cause of action for negligence requires 
that the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant had a duty of care, that she breached 
this duty, and that the breach caused a compensable injury. Many courts have held 
that life or human existence cannot constitute a legally compensable injury. Others 
have determined that, in wrongful living cases, there is an insufficient causal 
connection between the medical provider’s actions and the harms suffered by the 
plaintiff. In either case, the plaintiff will have failed to satisfy the elements of the 
cause of action and will not be permitted to recover.
 The most common roadblock in wrongful living cases is the judicial conclusion 
that continued life does not constitute an injury for the purposes of tort recovery. 
This principle arose first in the reproductive arena in the context of wrongful 
conception, wrongful birth, and wrongful life claims.61 Each of these claims is based 
on a medical provider’s negligence in providing reproductive care or counseling that, 
according to the plaintiffs, resulted in the birth of an unwanted child. 62 The simplest 
case—that of wrongful conception—might arise if a pharmacist negligently dispenses 
another drug instead of an oral contraceptive, and the parents claim that this 
negligence caused the conception and birth of an unwanted child. A more difficult 
case would be a wrongful life suit, in which a disabled child brings suit against her 
parents’ physician—for example, if the parents chose to conceive and give birth to a 
child as a result of the physician’s negligent prenatal counseling. Nearly every state 
prohibits wrongful life suits on the basis that a child cannot claim to be injured by 
having been born.63 Most also prohibit wrongful birth suits, which are similar claims 
brought by the parents of the disabled child. As the Georgia Supreme Court noted in 
Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority v. Graves, “We instinctively recoil from the notion 
that parents may suffer a compensable injury on the birth of a child.”64
 Courts that have rejected wrongful living claims rely on similar reasoning, noting 
that a plaintiff cannot claim to have been injured by having his life extended. In 
Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, an Ohio Supreme Court case that is 
perhaps the most widely cited in the literature on wrongful living claims, the court 
found that mere prolongation of life did not constitute a compensable injury.65 “There 
are some mistakes,” the court wrote, “indeed even breaches of duty or technical 
assaults, that people make in life that affect the lives of others for which there simply 
should be no monetary compensation.”66 It also held that while the plaintiff could 
recover for damages directly caused by unwanted resuscitation—such as burns from 
61. See, e.g., Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 1996) (discussing 
reproductive torts in the context of a wrongful living claim).
62. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Wrongful Pregnancy: Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 51:3 Med. Trial Tech. 
Q. 283, 283 (2005).
63. See id. at 286.
64. 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 1984).
65. See generally 671 N.E.2d at 299.
66. Id. at 228.
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defibrillation or broken ribs from manual resuscitation67—other foreseeable 
consequences, such as the pain and suffering and medical complications that normally 
arise at the end of life, bore an insufficient causal connection to the unwanted 
resuscitation to merit recovery.68 Numerous other courts have reached the same 
conclusion,69 and many commentators have criticized this seemingly unjust result.70 
Other courts, moreover, have found that because patients and families can seek ex 
ante injunctive relief for noncompliance with a patient’s end-of-life wishes, there is 
no need to permit ex post tort recovery of monetary damages.71
 Judicial precedent in both the wrongful living and wrongful birth/life contexts has 
repeatedly emphasized the notion that life is not a legally compensable injury. Because 
of this narrow definition of “injury” in the context of tort litigation, patients whose 
lawsuits are premised on the idea that they were harmed when physicians provided 
them with treatment to extend their lives often have difficulty recovering in court.
IV. PROMISING DEVELOPMENTS
 While tort claims seeking recovery for wrongful prolongation of life have 
traditionally not met with great success, a change may be on the horizon. A variety 
of legislative, administrative, and judicial developments suggests increased support 
for the idea that medical providers who disregard a patient’s wish to refuse life-
sustaining treatment have committed a harm for which some form of penalty is 
appropriate.
 A. Legislative Developments
 While some states provide statutory immunity for failure to comply with advance 
directives,72 others have established that medical providers may be civilly or criminally 
67. See generally Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that damages for 
injuries allegedly sustained by a resuscitated patient are limited to those connected to the battery claim).
68. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228–29.
69. See, e.g., Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 875 N.Y.S.2d 222 (2d Dep’t 2009) (“[T]he status of being 
alive does not constitute an injury in New York.”); Scheible v. Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Ctr., 988 So. 2d 
1130, 1133–34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla. 1992)) 
(holding that the Florida Supreme Court’s refusal to “weigh the value of impaired life against the value of 
nonexistence” in a wrongful life case precluded such a determination in the wrongful living case).
70. See, e.g., Lynch et al., supra note 3, at 134; Strasser, supra note 6, at 1038–41; William C. Knapp & Fred 
Hamilton, “Wrongful Living”: Resuscitation as Tortious Interference with a Patient’s Right to Give Informed 
Refusal, 19 N. Ky. L. Rev. 253, 275 (1992); Tricia Jonas Hackleman, Violation of an Individual ’s Right to 
Die: The Need for a Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 64 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1355, 1381 (1996). But see Adam 
A. Milani, Better off Dead than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a “Wrongful Living” Cause of Action 
When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients’ Advance Directives?, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 149, 227 (1997) 
(arguing that the wrongful living cause of action is not the best way to address these problems).
71. See, e.g., Estate of Taylor v. Muncie Med. Investors, L.P., 727 N.E.2d 466, 471–72 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000).
72. See supra Part III.A.
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liable for failure to comply with a patient’s advance directive.73 Statutes like these are 
based on the text of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, which provides that 
“[a] health-care provider or institution that intentionally violates this [act] is subject 
to liability to the aggrieved individual for damages of $[500] or actual damages 
resulting from the violation, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney’s fees.”74
 A review of the case law, however, suggests that these laws have not been enforced 
when noncompliance with patient wishes results in continued life, rather than 
premature death.75 Clearly, if a state wishes to provide concrete guidance about the 
obligation to withdraw care at a patient’s request, it must enact legislation explicitly 
targeted at preventing such harms.
 Patient advocates in New York State are currently working on a bill that would 
accomplish this goal.76 Their draft proposal provides that medical providers who 
undertake unwanted medical treatment will not be able to receive payment or 
reimbursement for such care.77 Moreover, it provides a civil cause of action for damages 
when unwanted medical treatment is provided.78 This bill is an important step in 
recognizing the rights of patients to refuse care at the end of life and, if passed, would 
set a good example for other states wishing to pursue legislative solutions.
 Beyond legislative proposals addressing unwanted provision of life-sustaining 
treatment, however, there also have been a number of promising developments in the 
administrative and judicial arenas. Recent decisions by administrative agencies and 
courts, as well as verdicts from juries, suggest an increased willingness by some 
73. See infra note 74; Memorandum from Kathryn Tucker, (Nov. 17, 2011) (on file with author) (“Currently, 
fifteen states classify disregard of advance directives as a form of unprofessional conduct, seven provide 
for a civil cause of action, and four allow for criminal charges.”).
74. Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 10, 9 pt. IB U.L.A. 122 (1993). For examples of state laws 
ref lecting the uniform provision, see Cal. Prob. Code § 4742(a) (West 2013) ($2,500 or actual 
damages); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 327E-10(a) (West 2013) ($500 or actual damages); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 
18-A, § 5-810(a) (2013) ($500 or actual damages); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-221(1) (West 2013) ($500 
or actual damages); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7A-10(A) (West 2013) ($5,000 or actual damages); Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 68-11-1811(a) (West 2013) ($2,500 or actual damages); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-22-411(a) 
(West 2013) ($500 or actual damages). For an example of a similar statute providing for non-monetary 
penalties, see Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 166.045(b) (West 2013) (“A physician, or a health 
professional acting under the direction of a physician, is subject to review and disciplinary action by the 
appropriate licensing board for failing to effectuate a qualified patient’s directive in violation of this 
subchapter or other laws of this state.”).
75. This conclusion is based on a review of the relevant cases citing to state laws regarding liability for violation 
of advance directives. See also Memorandum from Kathryn Tucker (Nov. 17, 2011) (on file with author) 
(“To date, there appears to be no successful uses of . . . [criminal,] professional or civil sanctions . . . . Such 
a lack of action on those fronts can probably be attributed to a general skepticism in the courts and medical 
profession to claims of damages resulting from prolonged life.”).
76. E-mails from David Leven, Exec. Dir., Compassion & Choices of N.Y., to author (Dec. 5 & 7, 2012) 
(on file with author) (noting that the Chair of the New York State Assembly Standing Committee on 
Health was reviewing this proposal as of December 2012).
77. Draft, New York Health Care Consumer Protection Act (on file with author).
78. Id.
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decisionmakers to recognize the wrongs associated with deviation from patients’ 
express end-of-life wishes.
 B. Growth in Administrative Penalties
 In the past decade, administrative enforcement actions relating to the unwanted 
provision of end-of-life care have proliferated at both the federal and state levels. 
While these actions provide no tangible relief to the patients who were harmed, they 
signal increased attention to the importance of this issue.
 At the federal level, institutional compliance with the Patient Self-Determination 
Act is a condition of participation in the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs.79 
A health care facility that fails to comply with the PSDA’s requirements regarding 
patient rights with respect to end-of-life care can be penalized or even excluded from 
Medicare and Medicaid. In the past decade, the Departmental Appeals Board of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has twice affirmed 
decisions by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) against two 
health care facilities for failing to satisfy these requirements.
 In 2003, a state agency surveyed the Brookridge Life Care & Rehabilitation 
Center in Arkansas and found violations in the nursing home’s compliance with 
federal certification requirements. In particular, the survey found that the facility 
had no documentation regarding at least two patients’ do-not-resuscitate (DNR) 
statuses, and that facility staff were unable to find any such documents when end-of-
life decisions were being made for at least one of these patients.80 HHS’s Departmental 
Appeals Board fined Brookridge $3,050 for a single day of noncompliance with 
CMS requirements; the agency found, however, that the facility’s conduct fell short 
of “substantial noncompliance,” which would have triggered a greater penalty.81
 In 2009, a similar situation occurred at Evergreen Commons, a long-term care 
facility in New York.82 A survey of patient records revealed that the facility was not 
in compliance with Medicare requirements regarding documentation of and 
compliance with patients’ advance directives and that Evergreen “lacked a coherent 
and consistent policy for identifying, and thus honoring, its residents’” directives; the 
survey also found that some facility staff were “sufficiently confused [about the 
facility’s procedures] to present the potential for more than minimal harm.”83 
Consequently, the administrative law judge upheld a penalty of $10,000 for 
substantial noncompliance with program requirements.84
79. See generally supra Part II.
80. See Brookridge Life Care & Rehab. Ctr., Decision No. CR1538 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 
Departmental Appeals Bd. Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://www.hhs.gov/dab/decisions/CR1538.htm.
81. Id.
82. See Evergreen Commons, Decision No. CR2372 (Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Departmental 
Appeals Bd. May 20, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/dab/decisions/civildecisions/cr2372.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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 Some state agencies have taken similar actions when faced with allegations of 
physician noncompliance with advance directives. The Office of Inspector General 
of the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services, for example, has issued at 
least one citation to a long-term care facility for resuscitating a patient in violation of 
a DNR order.85
 Finally, administrative law judges have upheld state disciplinary boards’ sanctions 
of medical providers for failure to comply with patients’ end-of-life wishes. In a New 
York case, the state medical board disciplined a gynecologic oncologist, Mahmood 
Yoonessi, for, among other things, resuscitating multiple patients who had signed 
DNR orders and whose families opposed continued treatment.86 The disciplinary 
board chose to revoke Yoonessi’s license to practice medicine in New York.87
 These administrative decisions provide no relief for patients who have already 
suffered harm as a result of a facility’s failure to document and comply with advance 
directives, and are unlikely to provide precedential support for wrongful living claims. 
However, CMS is actively monitoring health care facilities’ compliance with the 
PSDA and fining them for noncompliance, and state administrative agencies are 
attuned to physicians’ deviations from end-of-life care instructions. All of this suggests 
an increased focus on the consequences of noncompliance. Any increased attention to 
the plight of patients whose advance directives are not followed is a promising 
development in the path towards recognition of tort recovery for wrongful living.
 C. Recovery for Direct Harms and Medical Expenses
 While courts typically have been reluctant to award damages for the wrongful 
continuation of life, plaintiffs in wrongful living suits have been able to recover 
limited damages for pecuniary harms directly caused by unwanted resuscitation or 
medical treatment.
 As recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Anderson, a patient who is provided 
with life-saving treatment against her wishes may be able to recover damages 
associated with physical injuries directly resulting from the unwanted treatment; 
these could include injuries such as burns resulting from defibrillation,88 broken 
bones resulting from resuscitative efforts,89 or physical injuries associated with 
intubation.90 There seems to be relatively little controversy about a patient’s ability to 
recover from direct physical harms such as these, and plaintiffs bringing wrongful 
living suits would do well to demand such damages in their complaints.
85. See Valarie Honeycutt Spears, System Suggested for DNR Tracking, Lexington Herald-Leader (May 
4, 2009), http://www.kentucky.com/2009/05/04/783805/system-suggested-for-dnr-tracking.html.
86. Mahmood Yoonessi, M.D., BPMC 02-188, 2002 WL 33840948 (N.Y. Dep’t of Health Bd. for Prof ’l 
Med. Conduct June 5, 2002).
87. See id. For further discussion of this case, see Pope, supra note 29, at 287–89.
88. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio 1996).
89. See id.
90. See Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
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 Moreover, at least one court has held that patients who are provided with life-
saving care against their will may be entitled to recover medical expenses for the 
unwanted treatment.91 In the 1998 decision Gragg v. Calandra, an Illinois appellate 
court found that the Illinois Family Expense Act provided a mechanism for recovering 
“wrongfully caused medical expenses”—in this case, expenses stemming from 
unwanted open-heart surgery and life support.92 In a similar New York case, a court 
denied recovery of medical expenses due to uncertainty about the patient’s end-of-life 
wishes, but seemed to suggest that recovering medical costs would have been a 
possibility had the patient’s wishes been clearer. 93 Accordingly, patient advocates 
should review itemized hospital bills and specifically seek recovery of the costs of 
unconsented-to care.
 D. Some Claims Survive Motions to Dismiss
 While no court has gone so far as to say it recognizes a cause of action for 
“wrongful living,” some courts have permitted well-crafted claims seeking similar 
recovery to proceed against a defendant’s motion to dismiss. For example, the Illinois 
appellate court in Gragg was open to the possibility of recovery for unwanted 
continuation of life, though it did not refer to the plaintiff ’s claim as one for “wrongful 
living.”94 In Gragg, the hospital allegedly performed open-heart surgery without a 
patient’s consent and subsequently provided unwanted life support after the patient 
suffered irreversible brain damage.95 The patient’s family raised a variety of claims 
against the physicians and the hospital where the underlying treatment occurred, 
including a battery claim for the administration of unwanted treatment. Although the 
trial court initially dismissed the battery claim, the appellate court reversed, allowing 
the case to proceed as a traditional battery action.96 Indeed, even courts that have 
rejected recovery for wrongful living in particular instances have included supportive 
judicial language in their opinions. In Anderson, for example, the Ohio Supreme 
Court rejected a cause of action for wrongful living when a patient was resuscitated 
despite a “No Code Blue” order on his chart, but a concurring judge suggested that 
recovery might be available when a medical professional blatantly “ignor[es] a living 
will or a durable power of attorney for health care . . . .”97
91. Even in wrongful birth and wrongful life cases—the reproductive precursors to wrongful living suits—
courts have generally allowed parents to recover medical expenses directly caused by the provider’s 
negligence, such as the expenses related to delivery and hospitalization of an unwanted child. Sawicki, 
supra note 62, at 287.
92. 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
93. See Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 82 N.Y.2d 10, 17–18 (1993).
94. See generally Gragg, 696 N.E.2d at 1286–87.
95. See id. at 1285.
96. See id. at 1284–87. The court did not, however, explicitly address the type of damages that might be 
available beyond recovery of expenses for unwanted medical treatment. See id. at 1286.
97. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio 1996) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted) (“Short of ignoring a living will or a durable power of attorney for health 
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 Two recent decisions have shown that there is continuing judicial support, at 
both the state and federal levels, for the viability of a wrongful living cause of action.
 In 2011, a state trial court in Oklahoma heard Callison v. Hillcrest Healthcare System, 
a case in which a hospital allegedly continued intubation of a patient in violation of his 
advance directive and the wishes of his family.98 The patient’s family claimed that 
despite his DNR order and advance directive, the hospital continued ventilation for 
eight days, with “the end result of ventilating” the patient being that he was subjected 
“to a painful, agonizing death by the very caregivers . . . who were supposed to have 
helped ease [his] pain and give him a better quality of life as he and his family prepared 
themselves for his death.”99 The court denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss with 
respect to the claim of battery, which was based on allegations of wrongful intubation 
and medical negligence.100 Court filings indicate that the case against the hospital 
ultimately settled.101
 In 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed Self v. 
Milyard, a case brought by a prisoner serving a life sentence in the Colorado Department 
of Corrections (CDOC).102 The prisoner alleged violations of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments in connection with the prison’s failure to honor his DNR 
directive, which both parties agreed was “validly executed . . . and . . . binding upon the 
CDOC.”103 The district court ultimately found that the prisoner had not made out a 
valid Eighth Amendment claim because he offered no evidence that the DNR had 
actually been triggered—the prisoner had not suffered a cardiac or respiratory arrest, 
and his condition was the result of an unsuccessful suicide attempt.104 However, the 
court in no uncertain language emphasized that the prison’s procedures for documenting 
and responding to advance directives was deeply f lawed: “[I]t is constitutionally 
mandatory that a prison have in place a reasonable and effective method of assuring 
that an inmate’s DNR directive will be honored . . . . There is simply no excuse not to 
care medical professionals should not be subjected to liability for carrying out the very mission for which 
they have been trained and for which they have taken an oath.”).
98. See Callison v. Hillcrest Healthcare Sys., No. CJ-2010-3197, 2011 WL 7990001 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa 
Cnty. Apr. 14, 2011). See also Plaintiff ’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, 
Callison v. Hillcrest Healthcare Sys., No. 201003197 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cnty. Sept. 28, 2011), 2011 
WL 8058079 [hereinafter Callison Brief in Support].
99. Callison Brief in Support, supra note 98, at 4.
100. Callison, 2011 WL 7990001, at 8.
101. See Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant AHS Medical Center, LLC, Callison v. ACS Hillcrest 
Med. Ctr., LLC, No. CJ-2010-3197 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cnty. May 14, 2012). See also Summary of 
Callison v. AHS Hillcrest Med. Ctr., LLC, MoreLaw Lexapedia, http://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/
case.asp?n=CJ-2010-3197&s=OK&d=55782 (last visited Jan. 2, 2014) (reporting a settlement with 
Hillcrest Medical Center in the amount of $650,000).
102. Self v. Milyard, No. 11-CV-00813-RBJ-CBS, 2012 WL 3704958, at *1 (D. Colo. July 31, 2012).
103. Id. at *1, *5.
104. See id. at *2–3, *9.
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do so.”105 The court found that the prison “did not . . . establish or maintain a reliable 
method of assuring” that the plaintiff ’s wishes would be followed because it did not 
flag his file with a sticker or include a DNR notation anywhere in his medical records.106 
Had the plaintiff been in a condition that would have triggered his DNR order, the 
court’s language suggests, he would have had a valid constitutional claim.107
 The fact that two courts in the past two years have either allowed a wrongful living 
claim to proceed, or left open the possibility that such a claim might succeed under the 
right circumstances, is a very positive sign. Even if these cases are not precedential for 
a particular plaintiff in state or federal court, future litigants raising similar claims 
would be well advised to cite to Callison and Self for their persuasive value.
 E. Cases Ripe for Appellate Review
 In addition to the supportive judicial language cited above, procedural decisions 
by some courts suggest a willingness to revisit the issue of wrongful living recovery. 
In a recent New York case, a suit was brought against Jamaica Hospital Medical 
Center by the widow of a patient who was resuscitated twice against hospital orders 
and the family’s explicit wishes.108 Two lower courts109 rejected the plaintiff ’s claims, 
citing precedent from wrongful life cases establishing that “the status of being alive 
does not constitute an injury in New York.”110
 The plaintiff ’s attorneys sought discretionary appeal from the New York Court of 
Appeals, the state’s highest court, arguing in part that the lower courts’ reliance on 
wrongful life cases was misplaced—specifically, that each of the cases the lower courts 
relied on for support dealt with wrongful life claims by disabled children asserting 
damages for having been born.111 The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal,112 a 
move that suggested that the court was willing to reconsider the lower courts’ 
decisions, possibly in light of the plaintiff ’s shocking allegation that the hospital 
105. Id. at *8.
106. Id. at *7.
107. Self is somewhat unusual in that it involves a constitutional claim, rather than a pure tort claim—most 
patients who receive life-sustaining care against their wishes are not being treated by medical providers 
who are state actors, and therefore have no basis on which to bring a constitutional claim. See generally 
Klavan v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 60 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that state regulation, 
licensing, and financial assistance is not sufficient to classify a private, not-for-profit hospital as a state 
actor for the purposes of liability in a federal civil rights action); Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F. 
Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987) (reaching an analogous legal conclusion in similar federal civil rights 
action).
108. Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 875 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (2d Dep’t 2009).
109. See Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 25029/2004, 2007 WL 6860641 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 
May 11, 2007); Cronin, 875 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
110. Cronin, 875 N.Y.S.2d at 223 (citing Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 63 N.Y.2d 978, 979 
(1984); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412 (1978)).
111. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 2007-05447 (2d Dep’t Dec. 31, 
2007), 2007 WL 6861253 at *14–18 [hereinafter Cronin Brief for Plaintiff].
112. Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 12 N.Y.3d 715 (2009).
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disregarded a documented DNR order on two separate occasions.113 Before the Court 
of Appeals heard the case, however, the plaintiff ’s appeal was withdrawn, roughly 
four-and-a-half months after leave to appeal had been granted.114 While one cannot 
read too deeply into an appellate court’s willingness to review a lower court decision, 
at the very least, one can conclude that the Court of Appeals considered the issue of 
recovery for wrongful living to be ripe for review.
 F. Settlements Between Parties
 Settlement is the process by which litigants mutually agree to resolve their 
dispute for a set dollar amount, rather than go to trial. Private settlement of a legal 
dispute does not resolve questions of liability and thus has no precedential value. 
However, in the context of a suit by a private individual against a health care provider 
or medical institution, a settlement may indicate that the defendant considered the 
plaintiff ’s claims as likely to succeed115—or, at the very least, as requiring substantial 
resources to defend.116 Some recent settlements relating to the enforcement of 
patients’ end-of-life wishes are worth noting.
 In 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) brought suit against the 
New Mexico Orthopaedic Surgery Center, which required patients to sign a 
document acknowledging that the facility does “not honor [requests] for ‘Do Not 
Resuscitate’ status and/or Advance Directives or Living Wills.”117 The facility 
claimed that it had reasons of conscience for having such a policy, as permitted under 
state law.118 The plaintiffs, however, noted that there was nothing in the facility’s 
bylaws or mission statement that indicated a conscientious commitment to religious 
doctrine requiring a policy of noncompliance with DNR orders.119 The parties 
ultimately settled, and the Center agreed to clarify the language on its intake forms, 
113. See Cronin Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 111, at *6–9.
114. See Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 13 N.Y.3d 857 (2009). The attorney who served as plaintiff ’s 
appellate counsel in Cronin has publicly stated that the litigation concluded with a settlement. See Lisa 
Comeau, Remarks at New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Freedom of Choice at the End of 
Life (Nov. 16, 2012) (video available at http://youtu.be/8lgCi5VWx3g).
115. See David Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, 
Stupid, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1085, 1119–20 (2006).
116. Recent empirical research, however, suggests that settlements in medical malpractice cases are relatively 
rare. See id. at 1123. This appears to occur, at least in part, because defendants know that if they proceed 
to trial, they have a higher chance than plaintiffs of winning their cases. See id. at 1117–19. Indeed, a 
recent study has shown that, in most medical malpractice cases that proceeded to trial, the defendants 
failed to make any settlement offer at all. Id. at 1123.
117. Press Release, ACLU of N.M., ACLU of New Mexico Defends Patient’s End-of-Life Wishes (June 9, 
2005), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-new-mexico-defends-patients-end-life-
wishes.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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pay the ACLU’s legal fees, and donate $5,000 to the United Way of Central New 
Mexico.120
 The Cronin v. Jamaica Hospital Center case, referenced above in Part IV.E, also 
reportedly ended in a settlement after being litigated in New York courts between 
2004 and 2009.121 Although two lower courts rejected the plaintiff ’s wrongful living 
claim, the state’s highest court granted the plaintiff leave to appeal, shortly after 
which the case apparently settled for an undisclosed amount.122 That a case would 
settle only after the granting of a discretionary appeal in favor of a plaintiff suggests 
that the defendant was less than confident about its chances of success before the 
appellate court that granted the plaintiff leave to appeal. A settlement was likewise 
reached in the Callison case, referenced above in Part IV.D.123
 G. Substantial Jury Verdicts
 Finally, despite the fact that judicial analyses of tort law doctrine have traditionally 
been resistant to wrongful living as a cause of action, some juries considering these 
cases have been willing to award recovery. A widely publicized 1996 Michigan case, 
for example, resulted in a $16.5 million jury verdict for the family of Brenda Young, 
a comatose woman who was provided with life-sustaining treatment against the 
explicit wishes of her health care proxy.124 When Young awoke from her coma, she 
was in a partially vegetative state, but appeared to be suffering immensely.125 She 
spent hours each day screaming and repeatedly made statements such as “bury me.”126 
On appeal, the jury’s award to Young’s family was reduced to $1.4 million.127
 More recently, in 2007, a Florida jury awarded a nursing home resident’s 
representatives $150,000 in connection with a wrongful living suit.128 The suit claimed 
that Madeline Neumann’s advance directive rejected the use of “life-prolonging 
120. Press Release, ACLU of N.M., Following ACLU of New Mexico Lawsuit, Surgical Center Agrees to 
Honor Patients’ End-of-Life Wishes (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/
following-aclu-new-mexico-lawsuit-surgical-center-agrees-honor-patients%E2%80%99-end-.
121. See Lisa Comeau, supra note 114.
122. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.
123. See Summary of Callison v. AHS Hillcrest Med. Ctr., LLC, supra note 101.
124. See Pope, supra note 29, at 265; Lewin, supra note 24; Kellen F. Rodriguez, Suing Health Care Providers 
for Saving Lives, 20 J. Legal Med. 1, 28–32 (1999).
125. See Lewin, supra note 24.
126. Id.
127. See Pope, supra note 29, at 265; Laura Parker, In a Crisis, Do-Not-Revive Requests Don’t Always Work, 
USA Today (Dec. 19, 2006, 11:16 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2006-12-19-do-
not-revive-cover_x.htm.
128. Jury Awards $150,000 for Failure to Follow Directive, 14 Elder L. Issues 39 (Fleming & Curti, P.L.C., 
Tucson, Ariz.), Mar. 26, 2007, available at http://www.elder-law.com/2007/Issue1439.html; Missy 
Diaz, Jury: Home Violated Living Will, Sun Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.) (Mar. 17, 2007), http://
articles.sun-sentinel.com/2007-03-17/news/0703170091_1_nursing-home-morse-verdict; Parker, supra 
note 127.
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treatments or resuscitative measures” at the end of life, but that when nursing home 
staff found her unresponsive, they called emergency services and she was intubated 
and taken to the hospital.129 Neumann’s representatives brought suit, alleging “willful 
disregard of advance health care directive under [state law], willful disregard of the 
federal [PSDA], common law intentional battery, and violation of the Nursing Home 
Resident’s Rights Act.”130 The court dismissed these claims, noting, among other 
things, that the PSDA offered no private right of action; however, the court allowed a 
breach of contract claim to proceed on the theory that Neumann’s advance directive 
was incorporated into her contract with the nursing home.131 It was on this breach of 
contract claim that the jury found the nursing home liable and awarded damages, 
which were upheld on judicial review.132
 Other successful suits challenging the administration of life-sustaining treatment 
against a patient’s will have included claims for damages for emotional distress. In 
one such case, the emotional distress claim stemmed from a blood reinfusion that 
was performed on a patient who was a Jehovah’s Witness.133
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PATIENTS AND ADVOCATES
 While the legal developments described above do not guarantee success for 
future plaintiffs whose lives have been prolonged against their wishes, they offer 
reason to hope that there may indeed be life for the wrongful living cause of action. 
Until that happens, there are a number of steps that patients and their advocates can 
take to protect their interests at the end of life.
 First, patients should make their wishes with respect to life-sustaining treatment 
abundantly clear to their families, close friends, medical providers, and others 
responsible for their care. While documents such as advance directives provide a 
legal foundation for requests about end-of-life treatment, these documents are far 
less effective if family members and medical providers are not there to reinforce the 
patient’s wishes. This ongoing personal support is impossible if the patient has not 
previously had a conversation with the key parties to explain her end-of-life goals. 
Accordingly, patients should be encouraged to verbally communicate their wishes to 
those who will be acting as their representatives if they become unable to make their 
own decisions. Making certain that family and friends know one’s wishes is the best 
way to ensure that those wishes are honored.
 Second, when drafting an advance directive or living will, patients and their 
advocates must familiarize themselves with relevant state laws to understand what 
limitations, if any, they impose. For example: Does an advance directive only become 
effective if the patient has a terminal illness or another statutorily specified condition? 
129. Scheible v. Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 988 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
130. Id. at 1132.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1132–33.
133. See Pope, supra note 29, at 271 (citing Campbell v. Delbridge, 670 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Iowa 2003)).
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Will requests regarding refusal of nutrition and hydration be respected under state 
law? Understanding the nuances of the statutory limitations described in Part III.B 
can prevent surprise and disappointment when the time comes to enforce an advance 
directive against a third party’s objections. Similarly, patients should be sure that an 
advance directive is as clear as possible in describing the situations it contemplates in 
order to avoid contextual problems (such as those relating to emergencies and 
changed medical conditions)134 that might make its enforcement more difficult.
 Despite these precautions, patients or their advocates might nevertheless find 
themselves in situations in which health care providers are resisting a request for 
withdrawal of life-sustaining care. If no accommodation can be reached through 
consultation with the hospital’s ethics committee, or through mediation or other 
non-legal means, the most effective approach might be to seek injunctive relief in 
court. Courts generally have been quite willing to enforce advance directives from an 
ex ante perspective,135 and petitioning for injunctive relief can be a successful way to 
prevent further injury to the patient. Moreover, if a medical provider violates a court-
ordered injunction, penalties may be available.
 Finally, there is hope for those in the unfortunate circumstance of dealing, after 
the fact, with the violation of a patient’s end-of-life wishes. When life-sustaining 
care has been provided or continued against a patient’s will, and the resulting dignity-
related or pecuniary harms are sufficiently serious, pursuing tort recovery is an 
option. Awareness of the recent developments described in this article will give 
patient advocates a roadmap for bringing a more successful wrongful living claim.
 Patient advocates should continually track state legislative proposals relating to 
enforcement of advance directives and liability for noncompliance. While no state 
has yet adopted a law ensuring recovery for patients who have received unwanted 
life-sustaining treatment, proposals such as the one being put forward in New York136 
would be extremely helpful to patients if ultimately passed. Moreover, the passage of 
such a law in one state might inspire patient advocates and legislators in other states 
to adopt similar mechanisms for recovery.
 Likewise, attorneys drafting complaints and briefs on behalf of plaintiffs in 
wrongful living actions ought to take advantage of the legal developments described in 
Part IV. Some developments, such as the increased frequency of administrative 
penalties imposed for noncompliance with Medicare and Medicaid requirements 
relating to advance-directive documentation,137 can be used to support policy arguments 
about the importance of compliance with advance directives. The fact that federal and 
state agencies have become increasingly active in pursuing medical facilities for 
violating the PSDA suggests a nationwide recognition of issues related to patient 
wishes at the end of life. Clear judicial language suggesting that state institutions have 
a constitutional obligation to assure compliance with prisoner-patients’ advance 
134. See generally supra Part III.B.
135. See supra text accompanying note 35.
136. See supra Part IV.A.
137. See supra Part IV.B.
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directives also supports this line of reasoning.138 Furthermore, beyond the realm of 
policy arguments, these cases could be used more concretely in a wrongful living case 
to support a claim of institutional negligence for failure to have appropriate policies in 
place with respect to the documentation and enforcement of advance directives.
 Attorneys can also rely on recent judicial developments for their precedential or 
persuasive value. On the issue of damages, complaints should be drafted to include 
clear documentation of any direct physical injuries resulting from the administration 
of CPR, artificial ventilation, artificial nutrition and hydration, or other life-
sustaining treatments; briefs should include citations to cases such as Anderson139 and 
Allore,140 which recognize that such harms result in compensable damages. Complaints 
should also include documentation of the medical expenses associated with unwanted 
care, and a demand for recovery should be made either under state battery law or 
statutory authority for recovery of medical expenses, as in Gragg.141
 In their filings, attorneys should cite to cases in which courts have allowed 
wrongful living claims to proceed under traditional common law principles, including 
battery,142 negligence,143 intentional infliction of emotional distress,144 and breach of 
contract.145 References such as these will not only help support the plaintiff ’s claims 
against a motion to dismiss, but might also inspire defendants to settle rather than 
run the risk of proceeding with litigation whose outcome is by no means certain.
 Finally, patient advocates can take some solace in the fact that sympathetic juries 
might be persuaded to award recovery even in light of uncertain common law 
doctrine, as in the Michigan case from the mid-1990s and the Florida case from the 
late 2000s.146 Attorneys should include requests for a jury trial in their complaints 
and develop trial strategies that call upon jurors’ conceptions of fairness.
VI. CONCLUSION
 Theories of patient autonomy and bodily integrity have developed over the past 
century to the extent that a patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment—
whether on her own, through a proxy decisionmaker, or via a previously executed 
advance directive—is now an unshakeable part of American jurisprudence. In 
practice, however, medical providers and institutions may be unable or reluctant to 
provide care in accordance with the patient’s wishes. Reasons for such departures 
138. See Self v. Milyard, No. 11-CV-00813-RBJ-CBS, 2012 WL 3704958 (D. Colo. July 31, 2012).
139. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio 1996).
140. See Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
141. See generally Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
142. See id. at 1286; Callison v. Hillcrest Healthcare Sys., No. CJ-2010-3197, 2011 WL 7990001 (Okla. 
Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cnty. Apr. 14, 2011).
143. See Callison, 2011 WL 7990001.
144. See Gragg, 696 N.E.2d at 1285.
145. See Scheible v. Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 988 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
146. See supra Part IV.G.
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from standard practice include, but are not limited to: a lack of communication 
between providers and patients, inadequate institutional documentation of patient 
wishes, objections by family members to the patient’s preferred course of treatment, 
providers’ fear of liability, and individual or institutional conscientious refusal.
 In such situations, patients and families have found some success enforcing 
patient requests by asking a court to intervene and enjoin medical providers from 
providing continuing treatments. But for those patients who have received ongoing 
life-prolonging medical treatment against their objections, policymakers have 
historically been reluctant to provide additional legal remedies, such as damages for 
the pain and suffering associated with continued life. In particular, courts have 
resisted recognition of the wrongful living cause of action, which they find would 
improperly compensate patients for an injury that the law does not recognize—the 
harm of continued life. It is for this reason that commentators have continually 
referred to the right to refuse life-sustaining care as a “right without a remedy”147 and 
seem to consider the wrongful living cause of action a lost cause.
 This article, having more carefully analyzed recent developments in the law 
pertaining to wrongful living claims, reaches the conclusion that the future of this 
cause of action may not be as bleak as often predicted. Recent legislative and judicial 
developments signal increased awareness by policymakers of the issue of provider 
noncompliance with advance directives, which provides a strong foundation for future 
legal changes. Some judges have permitted wrongful living-type claims to proceed 
beyond the motion-to-dismiss stage in the form of claims alleging battery, negligence, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract.148 Even jurisdictions 
that reject the wrongful living cause of action recognize a right to damages associated 
with direct physical injuries and recovery of medical expenses for unwanted 
treatment.149 Finally, recent settlements and jury verdicts involving substantial 
amounts of money suggest that patients who have been wronged by the continuation 
of life-sustaining care might, in some cases, be able to recover for the harms they have 
suffered, even if a common law right to recovery has not been firmly established.
 On the basis of these promising developments, this article offers a cautiously 
optimistic perspective on the future of wrongful living claims. Using the 
recommendations set forth in Part V, patients can take concrete steps to protect their 
interests at the end of life, and advocates for patients who have been wronged can use 
the best arguments available for crafting successful tort claims. The hope, as reflected 
in this article, is that the trend towards recognizing some right to recovery by patients 
who have suffered unwanted treatment will continue. A decade from now, perhaps 
the wrongful living cause of action will no longer be considered an unattainable 
promise, but rather an active doctrine with a long life ahead of it.
147. See supra note 6.
148. See supra Part IV and notes 142–45.
149. See supra Part IV.C.

